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Abstract
Nowadays, wireless networking is ubiquitous. In wireless communication systems, multiple nodes exchange data during the transmission time. Due to the natural use of the
communication channel, it is crucial to protect the physical layer to make wireless channels
between nodes more reliable. Jamming attacks consider one of the most significant threats
on wireless communication. Spread spectrum techniques have been widely used to mitigate
the e↵ects of the jammer. Traditional anti-jamming approaches like Frequency Hopping
Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) require a sender
and a receiver to share a secret key prior to their communication. If this key is compromised by the jammer, the jammer can then generate the frequency hopping patterns or the
spreading codes used by the communicators to disrupt the wireless communication. This
dissertation includes two works as a countermeasure of jamming attacks using DSSS without
the requirement of sharing a secret key.
In the first work, we propose the Randomized Positioning DSSS (RP-DSSS) scheme as
an extention to RD-DSSS. RP-DSSS randomly relocates the index codes for each message.
This randomization hides the indices from the adversaries and thus achieves the enhanced
security. Also in this dissertation, we design an onion spreading technique, which encodes
the random positions recursively using RP-DSSS, and pads additional spreading codes to
reduce the probability that a jammer can infer these random positions.
In the second work, we propose Random Allocation Seed DSSS (RAS-DSSS) which mainly
focuses on concealing a random seed from the attacker by inserting it at a random position
of a spreading message. In RAS-DSSS, We develop a new technique to identify the location

vii

of a random seed at a receiver by aligning between multiple received messages. Thus, a
receiver can obtain the position of a random seed, and then he can recover both a random
seed then regenerating the spreading codes used to spread an original message.

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction

The fast growth of wireless communications in the communications industry has captured
the attention of the media and peoples imagination. In recent years, developed countries have
witnessed the replacement of antiquated wired systems by wireless networks. For instance,
many public buildings, airports, homes, hotels, businesses, and campuses have replaced wired
systems by wireless systems.
Additionally, many realistic systems, such as automated highways, smart homes, and
intelligent appliances, have emerged from various research ideas. The explosive growth of
wireless networks in the communications industry in the future will exceed that of wired
networks because of the many advantages it o↵ers, such as convenience, mobility, expandability, and cost. Even though wireless networks have numerous benefits, they coupled with
security vulnerabilities and threats.
In communication through a wireless system, the critical elements include the transmitter and receiver during transmission time of information. Due to the open share medium,
wireless networks are prone to many security threats and attacks. Some of the safety threats
are Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on wireless networks [1]. Other security vulnerabilities include man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack [2], message injection [3], and eavesdropping
attack [4].
In wireless networks, exchanging data among legit and authorized nodes in the presence
of numerous security threats is challenging. It is essential to maintain the security requirements for the wireless networks to protect the wireless channels from the attacks. Some of
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the critical security requirements which make wireless networks to be more secure include
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. These requirements are defined below:
Confidentiality

Intigrity

Availability

Figure 1.1: Security requirements of the wireless networks.

1. Confidentiality:
It implies that the ability to access data is available only to authorized users. Legitimate senders and receivers can transfer and receive data in a wireless communication
system. Also, the data cannot disclose to unauthorized users. For instance, to assure
confidentiality, the sender first encrypts the original message using a secret key known
to the receiver. Then, the sender transmits the encrypted data to the receivers side.
To recover the exact information, the recipient decrypts the received signal using the
same secret key. An attacker cannot recover the original message without knowing
the secret key. In this regard, the DiffieHellman key exchange (DH) protocol is used
between nodes to generate a secret code over a channel that is public [5].
2. Integrity:
In wireless communication systems, data integrity means that all transmitted data
must be reliable and accurate without being altered or modified by unauthenticated
2

users. A compromised node can significantly damage information integrity by launching malicious attacks, such as data injection or message modification. Generally, it
is difficult to identify the attacks resulting from nodes that are compromised because
these malicious codes also have strong identities [6].
3. Availability:
The availability requirement means that all authorized users are capable of accessing
all available resources on the network upon their requests. Data availability violation
can be by the DoS attacks with capabilities of preventing both a sender and receiver
from exchanging data by making the communication channel busy. For example, an
unauthorized node can generate interference by launching DoS attacks, also called
jamming attacks, which in turn disrupts the communication channel between legitimate
users [7].
The security requirements of the wireless networks mentioned above should be the same
as the one in wired networks. However, due to the open nature of the wireless communication
system, it is subject to many security threats. For instance, jamming attacks a↵ect the availability of wireless networks. As mentioned earlier, assuring all these security requirements
of the wireless network can be challenging [8–14].
1.1

Wireless Jamming Attack
This section1 presents a brief introduction of jamming attacks. As we mention, in a

wireless communication system, both a transmitter and a receiver share critical information
during the transmission time. This makes the wireless channels to be subject to challenging
aspects, such as noise and interference. Additionally, there are security concerns associated
with wireless communication systems due to open nature of wireless networks, and the
1
This section was published in 2019 Wireless Jamming Attack. In: Shen X., Lin X., Zhang K. (eds)
Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks. Springer, Cham [15]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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Sender

Receiver

Jammer

Figure 1.2: Wireless jamming attacks.
limitation of the power and computation capability of each device. Jamming attacks aim to
target the channel of wireless communication systems, and to prevent both a sender and a
receiver from sharing data.
A jammer aims to prevent a legitimate sender and receiver from sending and receiving
messages. He can simply emit noise signal to make the channel busy such that a sender is not
able to transmit data. Also, a jammer can send junk data to a receiver. As a result, a receiver
can not recover the received message correctly. Both non-reactive and reactive jammers are
considered as the most popular types of jamming attacks. A non-reactive jammer has no
knowledge about the channel usage status. On the other hand, a reactive jammer senses the
channel before it starts jamming. If the channel is idle, the jammer stays quiet. If a jammer
detects transmission on the channel between a sender and a receiver, it starts emitting noise
signal on the channel.
In fact, it is important to make the wireless communication between a sender and a
receiver reliable by developing new schemes to mitigate the e↵ects of jamming attacks. Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)
are examples of spread spectrum techniques that have been widely used to defend against
jamming attacks for wireless communication systems (e.g., [16, 17]). Traditional FHSS and
DSSS assume that the sender and the receiver share the same secret key to encode messages.
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Figure 1.3: Basic FHSS communication.
The shared secret key enables the communicators to generate the same frequency hopping
patterns or spreading code sequences [18]. In the following, I give background information
about traditional FHSS and DSSS, respectively. Also, I point out the limitations of these
techniques.
1.1.1 Background Information on FHSS
FHSS transmits the wireless signal over multiple channels to avoid interference. Specifically, the transmitter and the receiver hop from one frequency to another based on a shared
frequency hopping pattern generated by a pseudo-noise (PN) generator. The transmitter
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multiplies the transmit signal with a carrier of di↵erent frequencies, and the receiver searches
signals according to the corresponding frequencies.
A receiver must be able to align with the signal sent by the transmitter. Towards this
goal, both the transmitter and the receiver may stay on a certain channel without hopping
until they hear from each other, or the transmitter may stay on a certain channel, and the
receiver searches over di↵erent channels until it discovers the signal from the transmitter.
Once the signal alignment is done, the transmitter and the receiver can start hopping over
di↵erent frequencies according to the shared frequency hopping pattern. Strasser et. al.
proposed a new way for signal alignment by using uncoordinated hopping and public key
cryptography [19]. The basic idea is to let the transmitter and receiver randomly hop over
di↵erent frequencies but at di↵erent hopping rates. Once the communicators are on the same
channel, the transmitter sends the receiver a secret value that is encrypted by the public
key of the receiver, who will decrypt this value using the corresponding private key. The
transmitter and the receiver then generate shared hopping pattern based on the secret value.
The advantage of this method is that the transmitter and the receiver are no longer required
to have a shared secret key prior to the wireless communication.
1.1.2 Background Information on DSSS
The concept of DSSS is more complicated than FHSS. DSSS is a modulation technique
that can be applied to a base band signal to increase its bandwidth. This can be achieved
by multiplying an original signal by a spreading code formed by chips. This spreading code
is considered as a pre-shared secret key between a sender and a receiver to expand a signal.
Each spreading code is represented by a sequence of bits with values of 1 and -1, or 1 and 0
as polar or non-polar representations, respectively ( [20,21]). Each bit of an original message
is multiplied with a spreading code and the result is the spreading message to be transmitted
through the wireless channel. A receiver does the reverse steps of a sender to despread a
6
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Figure 1.4: Basic DSSS communication system.
message. Figure 1.4 shows a basic DSSS communication system with two functions, including
spreading and de-spreading.
To illustrate how to spread and de-spread a message, assume that “10” represents the
original message, and +1-1-1+1 represents the spreading code used to spread the original
message. The sender first converts the original message “10” from un-polar to polar form,
i,e,“10” is converted to +1-1. Then, the sender multiplies each bit of the original message
with a spreading code to generate the spreading result. For this example, the result is
+1-1-1+1-1+1+1-1.
To de-spread a received message, the receiver needs to correlate the received message with
a local replica of the spreading code. In this example, the received message is +111+11+1+11
and the local replica of the spreading code is +1-1-1+1. The receiver aligns +1-1-1+1 with
the rst 4 chips of the received message (i.e., +111+1) and correlates them to get bit +1
(i.e., “1” in non-polar form), and then aligns +1-1-1+1 with the next 4 chips of the received
message (i.e., -1+1+1-1) and correlates them to get bit 1 (i.e., “0” in non-polar form).
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Regarding the synchronization, in DSSS, identifying the beginning of a received message
from the incoming bit stream is important for a receiver to recover the original message. This
can be achieved by taking advantage of the auto-correlation property of the spreading code.
A receiver computes the correlation between the received message and the spreading code
in a sliding window way, and high correlation indicates the beginning of a message [21, 22].
1.1.3 The limitations of FHSS and DSSS
Both FHSS and DSSS have obvious limitations. In FHSS and DSSS, senders and receivers need to share the same secret key to establish anti-jamming communication, for
instance, frequency hopping patterns in FH and spreading codes in DSSS. Additionally, if
a jammer knows the secret key, then he can jam the communication channel by using the
same frequency hopping patterns and spreading code.
The previous limitations of the classical anti-jamming techniques have developed in recent
years. Research work has been done to overcome the concern of establishing jammingresilient communication with a pre-shared secret key. Strasser et al. proposed an antijamming system based on an Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping (UFH), which enables two
wireless devices to establish a secret key during the transmission time in the presence of
a jammer ( [19]). Pöpper et al. created a scheme called Uncoordinated Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (UDSSS), which can remove the requirement of a shared secret key for
DSSS systems [18], and a sender always selects random spreading code sequences from a
public set to spread a message.
Randomized Di↵erential DSSS (RD-DSSS) is another anti-jamming system developed to
remove the requirement of a shared secret key. In RD-DSSS, both a sender and a receiver
share public spreading code sequences. A sender spreads a message based on a chosen index
code, which is appended to the end of a spread message to facilitate the decoding at the
receiver [17]. Liu et al. developed a new scheme, named Delayed Seed-Disclosure DSSS
8

(DSD-DSSS), against jamming attacks with no need of sharing a secret key. They achieve
anti-jamming wireless communication by generating a random seed, which can be used to
generate random code sequences to spread each message. To disclose a seed, a sender spreads
a seed using publicly known code sequence set and positions it to the end of a spreading
message [23]. This dissertation presents two systems as an extension to DSD-DSSS in [23]
and RD-DSSS in [17] to enhance their security issues. The following is a brief introduction
of the proposed techniques.
1.1.3.1

Randomized Positioning DSSS with Message Shu✏ing for Anti-jamming Wireless
Communications

The Randomized Positioning DSSS (RP-DSSS) scheme was proposed as an extension to
improve the security of Randomized Di↵erential DSSS (RD-DSSS). In RD-DSSS, the sender
randomly picks spreading code sequences from a set of public code sequences to encode
messages. However, if the jammer has enough computational power to infer the spreading
code sequences chosen by the sender before the transmission is complete, the jammer can
then jam the rest of the message transmission. The vulnerability of index codes roots from
the fact that they are located at a fixed position of a spread message (i.e., end of the message).
The fixed position makes them completely exposed to the adversaries.
To protect index codes, we therefore propose to randomly relocate the index codes for
each message. Specifically, we insert the index codes into a random position of a spread
message instead of appending it at the end of the spread message. To enable the receiver to
find the position of the index code, we design an “onion” spreading mechanism that treats
this random position as the payload of a new message and encodes them using RP-DSSS in
a recursive way. The receiver can despread the received messages by applying the reverse
operations done by the sender. To remove the requirement of a shared key, similar to RDDSSS, we also take advantage of public sets of spreading codes and code sequences. For an
9

original message, the sender and the receiver use a random code sequence from the set of
code sequences to spread and despread.
1.1.3.2

Random Allocation Seed-DSSS Broadcast Communication against Jamming Attacks

We propose a new technique, named Random Allocation Seed-DSSS (RAS-DSSS), based
on randomly allocating a position of a seed within a spreading message, which is an extension
to improve the security of Delayed Seed-Disclosure DSSS (DSD-DSSS). In DSD-DSSS, if
the size of a spreading message is fixed, a jammer can target a random seed within the
transmission time. Also if the size of a spreading message is variable, a jammer can send
noise signal for a long time to disrupt the data at a receiver. As a result, to protect a random
seed, we propose to randomly insert the seed into a random position of a spreading message.
To enable the receiver to obtain the exact position of a random seed, we propose a scheme
based on aligning two spreading messages within two transmissions. For example, after
receiving two spreading messages, a receiver uses a sliding window to identify the position
of a random seed. If the receiver can successfully determine the position of a seed, then he
can recover the original message by doing the reverse steps conducted by the sender.
1.2

Summary of Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are summarized below:
• Randomized Positioning DSSS with Message Shu✏ing for Anti-Jamming Wireless
Communications: The contribution of this work is three-fold. First, we identify the
vulnerability of the index codes of the RD-DSSS scheme. To mitigate this vulnerability, we accordingly propose the RP-DSSS scheme that places index codes at random
positions of a spread message to prevent adversaries from discovering these index codes.
Second, we develop the techniques that can inform the receiver the positions of index
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codes in the presence of jammers, and we integrate this technique into the RD-DSSS to
achieve a security-enhanced anti-jamming system, which does not require the shared
secret keys. Third, we perform computer simulations to validate the performance of
the proposed approaches.
• Random Allocation Seed-DSSS Broadcast Communication against Jamming Attacks:
The contribution of this work is three-fold. First, we identify the vulnerabilities on
existing DSSS based anti-jamming systems, and we propose a new scheme to enhance
the security of the most recent DSD-DSSS method, via positioning a random seed into
a random position on a spreading message. Second, we develop a novel technique to
identify the beginning of a random seed to enable the receiver to find the seed. while
concealing it from the jammer. Third, we perform simulations to validate our proposed
system in the presence of di↵erent kind of jammers. The simulation results show that
a receiver has a higher chance to find the seed compared with a jammer who needs to
perform much e↵orts to find the seed within a transmission time. Furthermore, our
simulations demonstrate how RAS-DSSS can reduce the probability that the random
seed to be jammed. For instance, figure 4.8 and 4.9 illustrate the probability that the
seed to be jammed in the presence of a non-reactive and a reactive jammer, respectively.
The probability can be reduced significantly when the size of Ce and Cp is 7000.
1.3

Dissertation Road-map
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the related works.

Chapter 3 demonstrates the proposed RP-DSSS scheme. Chapter 4 introduces the the second
proposed system, RAS-DSSS. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the future work and the conclusion
of this dissertation, respectively.
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Chapter 2: Related Work

Wireless communications have been used widely to exchange data between multiple devices. In a wireless communication system, both a transmitter and a receiver exchange
critical information during the transmission time. The adversaries can take advantage of
the open network and may launch several security attacks including Denial of service (DoS)
attack [1], man-n-the-middle (MITM) attack [2], eavesdropping attack [3], and message injection attack [4] to disrupt the transmission of data. Jamming attack is one of the most
significant emerging threats in wireless communications. Di↵erent studies have been carried
out in the last few decades (e.g., [21, 24–28]). The following sections define jamming attacks
and summarize previous and relevant works for anti-jamming techniques.
2.1

Jamming Attacks
Jamming attack is considered as one of the most serious threats to wireless communication

systems as it not only blocks the communication between the nodes but also consume the
energy of nodes. It disrupts the communication at the lowest layer, i.e. the physical layer,
which makes it hard to mitigate.Jamming is used by the military as a tool to interrupt the
communication of enemies [29]. Nevertheless, this threat applied to block the availability
of using networks for civilian use (e.g., [1, 30–33]). A jammer aims to prevent a legitimate
sender and a receiver from sending and receiving messages. He can emit noise signal to make
the channel busy, such that a sender can not transmit data wireless. Also, a jammer can send
junk data to the receiver, and as a result, the receiver can not correctly recover the received
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message. Thus, the major intention behind jamming attack is to disrupt the transmission of
information by blocking the channel. As these attacks degrade the performance drastically, so
the defense against them has been an increasing concern. E↵ective mechanisms are essential
to avoid jamming attacks and to detect them. In last few decades, many studies have been
conducted to introduce the countermeasures of jamming attacks (e.g., [2, 20, 25, 34–46]).
2.2

Anti-Jamming Techniques in Wireless Communication Systems
This section explores traditional and recently-developed anti-jamming systems on wireless

communication networks. Table 2.1 gives a summary of the most relevant works in this field
of study.
Spread spectrum techniques such as DSSS and FHSS are traditional anti-jamming techniques. These techniques can mitigate the e↵ects of the jammer if a small part of the
communication channels is jammed or if the transmission power of the jammer is low. There
are some obvious limitations of the classic DSSS and FHSS. In these techniques both the
sender and receiver agree on a pre-determined secret key. For instance, in FHSS and DSSS,
the same frequency hopping pattern and Pseudo-Noise (PN) code are shared between the
sender and the receiver, respectively. So, if the attacker somehow gets the knowledge of the
frequency hopping pattern or the spreading codes used, he can easily jam the communication
channel and prevent the legitimate nodes from communication [24, 40, 47–55].
Significant researches have been carried out, in the recent years, to overcome the limitations of the traditional FHSS and DSSS and to eliminate the requirement of a pre-define
secret key. Strasser et al. [19] proposed an anti-jamming communication system, called as
Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping (UFH) system. UFH allows the sender and the receiver
who do not share a secret key to establish a secret key for the jamming resilient wireless
communication. In this technique, two nodes communicate by randomly hopping between a
set of known frequency channels. The packet would be transmitted successfully if the two
13

nodes send and receive at the same frequency. Later on, this system was advanced and
improvements were made in [48, 56].
Though UFH and its developments in [48,56] removed the requirement of sharing a secret
key in wireless communication, they still have some limitations. One of these limitations
is that each message was split into multiple packets due to which the resemblance process
increased the overall time required by the system. Another limitation is that these techniques
can establish a secret key between two nodes only, which makes there use limited in broadcast
communication where the number of nodes is more.
Table 2.1: Summary of the most relevant work to the research in the dissertation.
System

Description

Problem addressed

Uncoordinated Frequency
Hopping (UFH) [19]

a sender and a receiver hope
randomly between a set of
known frequency channels.

a jammer can sense the
channel and sends message within the transmission
time.

Uncoordinated DSSS (UDDSSS) [18]

a sender spreads a message by randomly selects
a spreading code sequence
from a publicly known set.

a jammer can jam the transmitted signal by guessing
the spreading code.

Randomized
Di↵erential
DSSS (RD-DSSS) [17]

the message spread based on
the chosen index code from
the public spreading code
sequences.

a jammer targets the index
code to jam the message.

Delayed
seed-disclosure
DSSS (DSD-DSSS) [23]

a sender generates a random
seed to produce multiple
spreading code sequences to
spread a message.

a sender positions a random seed to the end of the
spreading message which
can be targeted by the attacker.

Baird et al. proposed a coding approach to encode the data into marks (e.g., short pulses
at di↵erent times) that can be decoded without any prior knowledge of keys [57]. However,
this method only works efficiently with short pulses in the time domain, and it cannot be
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directly extended to DSSS or FHSS systems [17]. To support DSSS systems, UDSSS and
RD-DSSS were proposed in [18] and [17] for jamming-resistant broadcast communication
which does not require sharing of a secret key.
In UDSSS, the sender randomly selects a spreading code sequence, from a publicly known
set, to spread the message and the receiver uses exhaustive search to identify the chosen
sequence for de-spreading. Compared to UFH, UDSSS does not depend on fragmentation.
However, it requires high proficiency to de-spread the received message. UDSSS is vulnerable
as the jammer can jam the transmitted signal by guessing the code used to spread the
original message. Also, if the jammer has enough computational power, it can de-spread the
beginning of the spread signal to identify the spreading code used. Moreover, if it successfully
identifies the spreading code, it can easily jam the rest of the spreading message within the
transmission time [35].
To overcome the vulnerabilities of UDSSS, Randomized Di↵erential DSSS (RD-DSSS)
scheme was proposed [7]. In this technique, the sender spreads messages based on the
indices of the public spreading code sequences, and the receiver uses these indices to identify
the spreading code sequences chosen by the sender. The indices are randomly chosen from
a public pseudo random code set and thus they are referred as index codes. Although RDDSSS can e↵ectively mitigate the aforementioned attacks against UDSSS and do not need
a shared key, it is still vulnerable to attacks. The index codes are essential to enable the
de-spreading at the receiver and they are appended at the end of the spread messages, so
they can easily become the jamming target of adversaries.
Later, Liu et al. developed a new technique, named delayed seed-disclosure DSSS (DSDDSSS), against jamming attacks. This method achieves the anti-jamming wireless communication by generating a random seed which can be used to produce multiple spreading code
sequences to spread a message [23]. To disclose a seed, a sender spreads a seed using publicly
known code sequence set and positions it to the end of a spreading message. The receiver
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bu↵ers the received message, decodes the random seed in order to regenerate the spreading
codes, and using the spreading codes to recover an original message.
DSD-DSSS also has some restrictions as the sender appends the spread seed to the end
of the spreading message. Assume that the size of a message is fixed, a jammer can easily
localize the seed to regenerate the spreading codes. They can use this code to spread the
jamming signal to prevent a receiver from recovering an original message. Even if the size of
the message is dynamic, the computation overhead required at the receiver side to recover
the seed would be high. Moreover, the jammer can still jam the seed by sending random
codes to confuse the receiver.
DSD-DSSS was later enhanced in [58]. Oh et al. developed an Advanced Random
Seed DSSS (ARS-DSSS) system as an extension of DSD-DSSS scheme. They developed a
new technique against seed jamming attacks. ARS-DSSS reduces the computation overhead
to compute the random seed within a variable size message. It spreads the last bit of the
random seed using a very long spreading code. However, the random seed is still vulnerable to
jamming attacks because it is also positioned at the end of the spreading message. Although
the size of a message may not be fixed, the jammer can estimate the approximate location
range of the seed to focus jamming the end of the message.
Recent work also considers the threats from broadband jammers, who can jam all frequency channels simultaneously and have a high transmit power to overcome the spreading
gain. Specifically, Xu et al. proposed to use timing-based covert channels to address broadband jammers [59]. The covert channels are constructed by linking the inter-arrival times
of a sender’s corrupted packets to information bits. In addition, BitTrickle schemes are proposed by [60] to establish the wireless communication in the presence of a broadband reactive
jammer. The basic idea is to utilize the short time delay caused by the channel sensing of
a reactive jammer to deliver information bits. The receiver may collect information bits
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from the unjammed parts of received packets and assemble these bits together to obtain a
meaningful message.
In this dissertation, the major focus was on developing anti-jamming techniques using
spread spectrum systems, especially DSSS. This study proposes RP-DSSS and RAS-DSSS
techniques as an extension to DSD-DSSS in [23] and RD-DSSS in [17] to compensate the
security issues in wireless networks. In RP-DSSS, we protect the index code by inserting it
at a random position within a spread message instead of appending it at a fixed position.
In the same way, in DSD-DSSS, we protect the seed by using it at a random position in a
spread message.
Thus, there are many approaches and techniques proposed for jamming detection (e.g.
[36, 61, 62, 62–65]), and minimizing the e↵ects of jamming in wireless sensor networks (e.g.
[2, 66]). All these approaches are complementary to ours.
2.3

Wireless Physical Layer Security
Security in the physical layer is an emerging topic in wireless communication networks

[11,67]. Adversaries who are located within the rage of legitimate communication constitute
a significant threat to the security of the communication [68]. For example, the eavesdropper intercepts data transmission between authenticated users, and the jammer disrupts the
legitimate communication between a sender and a receiver [69–72].
Other than traditional cryptography approaches, the physical layer characteristics, including radio channel properties and modulation errors, can be utilized to achieve security
in the communication system [73]. Previous studies have proven that physical layer properties can be successfully used to ensure the security of wireless networks. For instance,
information-theoretical security can be achieved by protecting the confidentiality of wireless communication against the eavesdropper. Additionally, the physical layer properties
can be used to develop and design upper-level security algorithms for authentication and
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key generation purposes (e.g., [2, 74–81]). Also, several physical-layer security systems have
been proposed to protect wireless information, including cooperative jamming [82–84], and
beamforming [85–87]. These techniques are also complementary to the technique used in
this dissertation.
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Chapter 3: Randomized Positioning DSSS with Message Shu✏ing for
Anti-Jamming Wireless Communications
1

This chapter introduces the first work in this dissertation. Similar to DSSS, RP-DSSS
achieves the anti-jamming capability by using spreading codes to obtain the spreading gain.
However, unlike DSSS, RP-DSSS relies on the correlation between two spreading codes to
encode each bit of an original message. Pre-shared keys are not required for RP-DSSS communications. Because RP-DSSS is an extension of the RD-DSSS scheme, we first introduce
how RD-DSSS works to facilitate readers’ understanding, and then we present our proposed
RP-DSSS scheme.
3.1

Basic Scheme of RD-DSSS
We assume that both the sender and the receiver share a set of spreading codes. According

to the property of spreading codes, the auto-correlation between two identical codes is high,
and the cross-correlation between two di↵erent codes is low. The sender encodes each bit of
the message separately. Specifically, bit “0” is encoded using a pair of di↵erent codes and bit
“1” is encoded using a pair of identical codes. The receiver decodes the spread message by
calculating the correlation between two codes. If the result of the correlation is high, then
the encoding of the corresponding bit uses two identical codes and thus the recovered bit is
“1”. If the correlation result is not high, then the recovered bit is “0” because two di↵erent
codes are used. The codes are randomly chosen from the spreading codes set.
2

This chapter was published in IEEE Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications 2016
[88] and IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing 2019 [89]. Permissions are included in
Appendix A.
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Figure 3.1: The basic scheme of DSSS.
3.1.1 Spreading
Figure 3.1 demonstrates an example of the RD-DSSS scheme. The original message M
is 1010. The sender randomly chooses four codes from the spreading code set to decode M .
Let p1 ,p3 , p4 , and p5 denote these codes. The first bit of M is 1, the sender repeats using
p1 . The second bit is 0, the sender randomly picks a di↵erent spreading code from the code
set. Assume p2 is selected. The rest of bits in M can be encoded in the same way and the
spreading outcome is p1 ||p2 ||p4 ||p8 ||p1 ||p3 ||p4 ||p5 .
3.1.2 Despreading
The receiver calculates the correlation between the i-th and i + L-th codes in a received
message, where L is the length of the message. In this example, the receiver computes
cor(p1 , p1 ), cor(p2 , p3 ), cor(p4 , p4 ), and cor(p8 , p5 ), and converts the correlation output to bit
1 or 0.
RD-DSSS reduces the communication overhead by using spreading code sequences, which
are also publicly known. A spreading code sequence is formed by concatenating the codes
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from the spreading code set, and is associated with an index code, which is a pseudorandom
noise (PN) code to identify the spreading code sequence chosen by the sender. The index
codes also form an index code set. As shown in Figure 3.1, the sender randomly chooses a
spreading sequence from the spreading sequence set and it is the sequence p1 ||p3 ||p4 ||p5 . The
sender then spreads the message using this sequence and appends the index code c1 to the
end of the spreading result, and thus the ultimate spreading output is p1 ||p2 ||p4 ||p8 ||c1 .
3.1.3 The Limitation of RD-DSSS

Index code set 9 = {c#, c1 , … , c> }
c# : p# pA p2||pC
c1 : p# pD p1||pE
...
M
Spreading

1

0

1

0

p#

p1

p2

p3

c#

A spread message

Jammer
Figure 3.2: The limitation of RD-DSSS.

As mentioned earlier, RD-DSSS scheme has an obvious limitation. The index codes are
always appended to the end of the message. This makes them easily become the target for
the attacker. The attacker can compute the correlation between the subsequence formed
by the first several bits of the index code and those of all possible index codes to identify
which index code was selected by the sender. The attacker can jam the rest of the index
codes by simply transmitting multiple index codes to deceive the receiver to obtain multiple
possibilities of the index code, thereby boosting the computational cost for despreading at
the receiver.
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3.2

RP-DSSS
To overcome the limitation of the RD-DSSS, we propose that the spreading codes have

the random-look because they are indeed generated by pseudorandom generators [21], and
naturally a message spread by these codes exhibit the randomness as well. Thus, inserting a
pseudorandom index code at any positions of a spread message would still make the entire
message look like a random sequence of

1 and +1. We hence propose to randomly relocate

the index codes. For each spread message, we insert the corresponding index code into
a random position, and the random-looking property of the spread message enables the
camouflage of the index code.
3.2.1 Onion Spreading
An important by-product question is how can the receiver identify the index codes, such
that it can find the corresponding spreading code sequence for the despreading. The receiver
and the adversary have the same knowledge about a spread message. It seems if the index
code is hidden from the adversary, then it is also hidden from the receiver. Nevertheless,
the communication roles of the receiver and the adversary are totally di↵erent. The receiver
aims to correctly decode a message after the message is received, whereas the adversary aims
to jam the message before the message transmission is complete. Thus, compared with the
receiver, the adversary has the timing constraint, i.e., it must jam the message within the
message transmission time. In contrast, the receiver can bu↵er received data content and
then take time to despread.
Based on this observation, we propose the idea of “onion” spreading, in which we treat the
index code as a new message and spread it using the RP-DSSS recursively. The jammer has
to exhaustively try all the possible positions of all messages to identify the index code before
the transmission completes, while the receiver has no such a time constraint. Moreover, the
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exhaustive search is not imposed at the receiver, because all index codes are revealed upon
the finish of the transmission. Assume that the original message is of m bits. The index
code can be inserted into m positions, and thus the length of the second new message is
log2 m. The spreading of the second new message also results in a new index code, which
yields a third new message of length log2 (log2 m). In this way, we generate multiple new
messages of lengths m, log2 m, log2 (log2 m),..., and 1. How do we transmit the original and
all additional messages in the presence of jamming?
Although the message length gets smaller, the message itself becomes more important
for the despreading. Because the correct despreading of the i-th message will rely on the
correct despreading of the next (i.e., i+1-th) message. For security, we adopt di↵erent levels
of spreading codes. Specifically, code sets P1 , P2 ,..., and Pn are used to spread the first,
second, ..., and the n-th message, where the code set Pi contains stronger spreading codes
of a higher spreading gain than the codes in the set Pi 1 . To achieve this, the length of a
code in Pi should be larger than that of a code in Pi 1 . Note that the probability that an
arbitrary position holds the index code increases as the message length decreases. We thus
pad additional bits to each message to restrain this probability under a desired value. In
what follows, we present the details of the presented scheme.
3.2.2 Spreading Code Sets and Code Sequence Set
Both the sender and the receiver share multiple sets of the spreading codes and spreading
code sequences. Let P = {P1 , P2 , ..., Pn } denote the publicly known spreading code sets.
In this paper, we assume that fi

fi 1 , where fi is the code length for the code set Pi .

RP-DSSS does not limit to certain spreading codes and any type of spreading codes can be
adopted as long as it has the low cross-correlation property. Typical codes include WalshHadamard codes and Gold codes [21]. Let C1 , C2 , ..., Cn denote the sets of code sequences.
Ci is used to spread the i-th message and each element of Ci is formed by the concatenation
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of spreading codes from Pi . Assume that the length of the i-th message is li . Ci can be
represented by Ci = pi1 ||pi2 ||...||pilk . Each code sequence is associated with an index code,
and we use I1 , I2 , ..., In to represent the index code sets that identify the code sequences for
C1 , C2 , ..., Cn .
3.2.3 Spreading
As an example shown in Figure 3.3, the original message M to be sent is of 128 bits
and we use m1 ||m2 ||, ..., ||m128 to represent M . To generate the first spread message M1 , the
sender randomly picks a code sequence from C1 . According to the chosen code sequence, the
sender creates the spreading result in a way that is similar to RD-DSSS, i.e., two identical
codes are used to spread “1” and two di↵erent codes are used to spread “0”. The original
message M has 128 bits and thus M1 is formed by 128 spreading codes from C1 . In this
example, the length of the first message M1 is 128. The sender inserts the index code of M1
after the 127-th spreading code. So the insertion position P OS1 = 0111111. The second
message M2 is thus generated by spreading P OS1 using the code sequence set C2 . The length
of M2 is 7 (i.e., log2 128). The sender inserts the index code of M2 after the 4-rd spreading
code and P OS2 = 100.
3.2.4 Despreading
The receiver receives messages M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 , and M5 . To recover the original message,
the receiver first despreads the last message M5 and the despreading order is reverse to the
spreading order. To despread message Mi , the receiver needs to know two main things: (1)
the position of the index code, and (2) the code sequence that was used to spread Mi . As
shown in Figure 3.3, M5 is spreaded by one spreading code, which indicates P OS4 . In this
example, P OS4 represents two possibilities and it is either 1 or 0. After P OS4 is identified,
the receiver can obtain the index code and then continues to despread M4 . Assume that the
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obtained index code in M4 is ĉ. The receiver computes the correlation between each index
code in I4 and ĉ, finds the index code that leads to the highest correlation with ĉ, and uses
the code sequence associated with this index code to despread M4 .
Let D = d1 ||d2 ||...||d1 denote the spreading code sequence identified by the sender. Further let S = s1 ||s2 ||...||sl denote the concatenation of the spreading codes in M4 . The receiver
calculates the correlation between S and D (i.e., cor(s1 , d1 ), cor(s2 , d2 ),..., cor(sl4 , dl4 )) to
find the index code of M3 . If cor(si , di ) is greater than a empirically per-defined threshold t,
then the recover bit is 1. Otherwise, the recovered bit is 0. The recover message leads to the
reveal of P OS3 , which can be used to despread M3 . In a similar way, the receiver identifies
P OS2 and P OS1 to despread M2 and M1 , respectively.
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Figure 3.4: Pi as a function of the number of padded spreading codes.

3.2.5 Security Enhancement by Padding
As mentioned earlier, due to the decreased message length, the probability that the
jammer can find the index codes increases as we approach to the end of the message chain.
We propose to pad additional spreading codes to the end of spread messages to control
this probability. Specifically, for the i-th message Mi , we randomly select LPi codes from the
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spreading code set Pi and pad them to the end of Mi . The index code can be inserted between
any two consecutive spreading codes of the padded Mi . Lemma 1 gives the probability that
an arbitrary insertion position (i.e., the position between two consecutive spreading codes)
points to the beginning of the index code.
Lemma 1. Assume insertion positions are equally likely to be inserted with the index codes.
For 1  i  n, the probability Pi that an arbitrary insertion position of the i-th message
1

Mi points to the beginning of the index code is

log2 (Li

spreading codes in the i

before padding (L0 is the number binary bits

1-th message Mi

in the original message M ), LPi
end of Mi

1

1

1

1 +LPi 1 )+LPi

, where Li

1

is the number

and LPi are the numbers of spreading codes padded to the

and Mi respectively.
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Figure 3.5: Pi v.s. the despreading for message length L0 of 128 and 256.

Proof. Mi

1

is spreaded by Li

1

spreading codes and LPi

1

additional padding codes are

appended to the end of Mi 1 . Thus, the total number of spreading codes in Mi

1

is Li

1

+

LPi 1 . The index code can be inserted between any two consecutive spreading codes of
Mi 1 , and thus the total number of candidate insertion positions is Li
leads to the next i-th message Mi that is composed by log2 (Li

1

1

+ LPi 1 , which

+ LPi 1 ) spreading codes.
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After padding extra LPi spreading codes to the end of Mi , the message size increases to
log2 (Li

1

+ LPi 1 ) + LPi . Because an index code is inserted into the candidate insertion

positions with equal probability, the probability Pi is therefore

1
log2 (Li

1 +LPi 1 )+LPi

.

3.2.6 Padding Spreading Codes
The sender treats the padded bits LPi as the unknown variable and solve it from Pi  tp ,
where tp is the desired upper bound of Pi . Note that LPi = 0 indicates that no additional
spreading codes are padded into Mi , and the security enhancement scheme degenerates
to the original one without padding. Figure 3.4 plots the impact of the number LPi of
padded spreading codes on the probability Pi . The original message length is set to 128
and LPi ranges between 10% and 100% of the original message length. We can see that Pi
significantly decreases as the number of padded spreading codes increases. In particular, for
the last message M5 , Pi = 0.0015 when the number of padded spreading codes is equal to
the length of the original message.
3.2.7 Despreading Cost
The receiver starts from the last received message Mn to identify the index code of
Mn 1 . Mn consists of Ln
Ln

1

1

+ LPn spreading codes, and thus the receiver needs to examine

+ LPn positions, each of which yields a potential index code. To verify, the receiver

correlate a potential index code with all the codes in In and a high correlation value that
pass a certain threshold suggests a correct index code. We point out that the decoding cost
of the index codes depends on the length of Mn . A large LPn of padded spreading codes
leads to high level of security (low P) but an increased decoding cost. Thus, LPn should be
carefully controlled to satisfy the trade-o↵ between security and the decoding cost.
Because the decoding cost depends on the number of spreading codes in Mn , we quantify
the decoding cost using the ratio of the number of candidate positions in Mn to the length
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L0 of the original message. This quantization will enable us to observe how much spreading
cost is required as compared to a naive RD-DSSS improvement, which does not advocate
the “onion” spreading but simply inserts the index code into a random position of a spread
message. The decoding cost for this extension is thus the number of spreading codes in
the spread message, and it is exactly the length of the original message. Figure 3.5 shows
the jamming probability as a function of the decoding cost, we can see that RP-DSSS can
reduce the probability P to small values while maintaining a low decoding cost compared to
the naive RD-DSSS improvement. For example, with a spreading cost that is only 20% of
that of the naive RD-DSSS improvement, the probability P is smaller than 0.02 and 0.04 for
message length of 128 and 256, respectively.
3.3

The Enhanced RP-DSSS
In RP-DSSS, the probability that a jammer can identify the index code increases as the

length of the i-th message Mi decreases. Specifically, the last message Mn has the most
significant information for a receiver to despread Mn
identify the index code used to spread Mn
index code in Mn

1. The receiver despreads Mn to

1. If the receiver can successfully identify the

1, then he can identify the index code of Mn

2 and so on for the rest

of messages. Consequently, the attacker can target Mn in order to prevent the receiver from
recovering the original message.
We propose enhanced RP-DSSS to address this limitation. The enhanced technique uses
the same way as RP-DSSS technique to spread and despread a message, but permutations of
messages are used to enhance the security. Similar to RP-DSSS, it does not require sharing
a secret key between the sender and the receiver and more bits at the end of the spreading
messages to confuse jammers.
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3.4

Overview of Proposed Method
The successful decoding of the i-th message depends on that of the i + 1-th message. If

we can hide the last message from the jammer, then the probability that the jammer can
identify and jam the index code of this messages and all other massages will be reduced.
To hide the last message, we propose to randomize the transmission order of all messages.
After generating the five spreading messages, the sender sends these messages in a random
order (e.g., M3 , M2 , M1 , M5 , and M4 ). Note that these messages vary in length, because
the i-th message encodes the index code of the i

1-th message and accordingly the size of

the i-th message is much shorter than the previous one. To prevent the jammer identifying
the original order of spreading messages, we propose to pad extra bits so that all messages
have the same length as the first message. For example, M2 ,...,M5 are of the same length as
M1 .
To despread the messages, both the receiver and the attacker need to check all possible
combinations. For example, if an original message is encoded into five spreading messages,
then they need to check 120 possible message combinations (i.e., 5!). The correct message
combination should allow the successful verification of the checksum and cryptographic signatures. However, the receiver has a significant advantage over the attacker in that the
receiver can first bu↵er all messages and then try to decode and verify each possible message
combination. Compared with the receiver, the jammer has to finish the decoding and verification of all 120 combinations before the transmission of the five spreading messages ends.
Otherwise, the jammer fails the jam goal.
It seems that the number of message combinations increases exponentially as the number
of spreading messages increases, and the decoding could be impossible if the original message
length is high. Nevertheless, for a message of length n, the number of spreading messages
actually increases very slightly in a logarithm way as the length of original message increases.
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For example, when the original message length increases from 128 bits to 4096 bytes (the
maximum transmission unit size of 802.11), the number of required spreading messages is
still 5. To further reduce the computational overhead at the receiver, instead of transmitting
a super large packet, the sender can divide large files and data into smaller standard packets
and spread each packet and send resulting spreading messages to the wireless channel.
3.4.1 Spreading Code Set and Code Sequence Set
Similar to basic RP-DSSS, both the sender and the receiver share a spreading code set
P. Let P = {p1 , p2 , ..., pn } denote the share spreading code set of n codes. Unlike the basic
RP-DSSS, the enhance RP-DSSS assumes that codes in P have the same length, because we
would like to reduce the chance that the jammer can discover the original order of spreading
messages by looking into message length. The code sequence set can be generated using the
following two generation schemes.
1. Basic generation scheme:
A dedicated set of code sequences is generated for each message. For instance, C1 , C2 , ..., Cn
are used to spread messages M1 , M2 , ..., Mn respectively. Each element of Ci is formed
by the concatenation of spreading codes from P, and each code sequence Ci is associated
with an index code Ii .
2. Overhead reduction generation scheme:
To reduce the storage overhead, we can use one code sequence set C for all messages.
Assume that C = {c1 , c2 , ..., cn } denotes the set of code sequences. If the length of the
original message is m, then each ci in C is formed by concatenating m random codes
from P. Assume C has q code sequences established in advance. Also assume that I
represents the index code set, and each index code is associated with a code sequence
ci . Like RP-DSSS, P, C, and I are publicly known.
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3.4.2 Spreading
The sender spreads the original message M using the same spreading method as proposed
for RP-DSSS. One important extra step is that the sender needs to pad messages so that
they have the same length. The sender may do padding either before or after spreading.
Assume that the length of an original message is m. If the sender decides to add padding
data before spreading, the sender can pad random bits to messages so that they are of the
same length equal to m. If overhead reduction generation scheme is used, there is only one
code sequence set C and the length of a code sequence in C is exactly the same as that of the
original message, i.e., m. Thus, for the i-th message Mi , the sender can simply picks one code
sequence from C in a random way and uses it to spread Mi . Note that the basic generation
scheme generates multiple di↵erent code sequence sets with di↵erent code sequence lengths,
but a unique code sequence set with the same code sequence length is sufficient for padding
before spreading. To simplify calculation, we do padding before spreading only with the
overhead reduction generation scheme.

32

If the sender decides to do padding after spreading, for the overhead reduction generation scheme, the sender uses the first li codes to spread message Mi and then appends the
remaining m

li codes to the end of the spreading results, where li is the length of Mi For

example, the length of M2 is log2 (m) and the first log2 (m) spreading codes in the chosen code
sequence are used to spread M2 and the remaining m

log2 (m) codes are used as padding

bits. For the basic generation scheme, the sender randomly chooses a code sequence from Ci
to spread Mi , randomly chooses m

log2 (m) codes from the code set P, and then append

P(hitting specific spreading message)

these codes to the end of the spreading result.
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Figure 3.7: The probability of hitting the last message.

3.4.3 Despreading
After receiving all n messages from the sender, the receiver needs to despread all possible
combinations to identify the correct message order and recover the original message. For
example, if the original message results in 3 spreading messages, the first, second, third
received spreading messages can be mapped to one of the 6 possibilities, including (M1 , M2 ,
M3 ),(M1 , M3 , M2 ), (M2 , M1 , M3 ), (M2 , M3 , M1 ), (M3 , M1 , M2 ), (M3 , M2 , M1 ). For each
possibility, the receiver first removes the padded data from the messages, and then uses
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RP-DSSS to despread. The correct combination will enable the receiver to see a meaningful

Probability that RX can recover M

decoded message that can pass message authentication or integrality check.
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Figure 3.8: The probability P that the receiver can recover the original message.

Let log2 n dxe denote the recursive logarithm calculation of the ceiling of x for n times.
For example, log2 3 dxe = (log2 d(log2 d(log2 dxe)e)e). The length of M1 , M2 , M3 , ..., Mi is
thus m, log2 dme, log2 2 dme,...,log2 i 1 dme, respectively. The last message Mn has only one
bit and hence the total number n of messages can be calculated by solving n from equation
log2 n 1 dme = 1. We use f (log2 dme, 1) to represent n. The total number of combinations
that the receiver needs to verify is thus f (log2 dme, 1)!. As discussed earlier, f (log2 dme, 1)
increases very slightly as m increases and a large file can be divided into smaller standard
network packets for transmission. Therefore, the total number of combinations that the
receiver needs to verify can maintain a small value even if the original message size goes
up dynamically. Figure 3.6 shows that the number of spreading messages is 6 spreading
messages even the length of original message is 105 -bit
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3.4.4 The Advantage of the Receiver over the Jammer
The receiver has advantage over the jammer that he can bu↵er the received messages
and take his time to despread them. In contrast, the jammer has to do exhaustive search to
obtain the chosen index code sequences used by the sender during transmission time . For
example, if the length of the original message M is 512 bit, and the number of chips in each
spreading code is 128. Also if the wireless device used is 802.11n with data rate of 50M bps
then the transmission time will be

numberof bits
datarate

=

512⇥128
50⇥106

= 0.00128 second. As a result, the

jammer will find difficulties to do the computational process within the transmission time.
3.4.5 The Probability of Hitting the Last Message
Figure 3.7 shows the impact of the number of the spreading messages SPM and the
number of re-transmission n of these messages on the probability that the jammer hits the
last message mi . As n and SPM increase, P decreases.
3.4.6 Probability that the Receiver Can Recover the Original Message
The main goal of the jammer is to corrupt the legitimate transmission of data between
the sender and the receiver. Both the sender and the receiver can mitigate the e↵ects
of corrupting data by retransmitting data at the sender side. Retransmitting the spread
messages plays an important role to reduce the probability that one of the spreading messages
is jammed. Assume that the probability P that one of the spreading messages is jammed.
Further assume the number of spreading messages is i-message. Then the probability that
one spreading message is not jammed is (1 P ). As a result, the probability that all spreading
messages are not jammed is (1

P )i . Assuming n is the number of re-transmission of these

spreading messages, the probability that all spreading messages are jammed is (1 (1 P )i )n .
As a result, the probability PRx that the receiver can receive correct spreading messages and
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recover the original message M is [1

(1

(1

P )i )n ]. Figure 3.8 shows that when P =0.4,

PRx is increased from 0.077 to 0.33 after increasing the number of re-transmission from 1 to
5. Thus, PRx significantly increases as P decreases and n increases. In other words, we can
increase the probability that the receiver can successfully recovered M through increasing
the number of re-transmissions of the spreading messages.
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Figure 3.9: Storage overhead when k = 64-bit, and q = 5000.
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Figure 3.10: Storage overhead when k = 128-bit, and q = 5000.
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3.4.7 Storage Overhead
The enhance RP-DSSS systems require to store P, C, and I. At the receiver side, the
receiver has to bu↵er the received messages in order to decode them. Figure 3.9 and 3.10
show a comparison of the storage overhead when RP-DSSS system has one code sequence
set and multiple code sequences sets. In figure Figure 3.9 and 3.10, we can see that when the
number of the code sequences q is ranges between 1 to 5000, and the number of bit in each
chips code k = 64-bit and 128-bit respectively, one code sequence set success in reducing the
storage overhead compared with multiple code sequence sets.
3.5

Simulation Result
We performed computer simulations using MATLAB to validate the performance of RP-

DSSS. The Type I attack discussed in RD-DSSS causes the worst probability for a message
being jammed. Thus, we consider the Type I attack in our simulation. In Type I attacks,
the jammer randomly selects codes from the code set, and transmits them to interfere with
the original message transmission.
A type I attacker cannot flip a bit of 1 to 0, because no matter which code it transmits,
two identical codes are always involved in the despreading process and the correlation is
always high. Nevertheless, the attacker can flip a bit of 0 to 1. Let ps1 and ps2 denote the
i-th codes of a spread message and the corresponding spreading code sequence respectively,
where ps1 6= ps2 . Further let pa1 and pa2 denote the i-th codes transmitted by the jammer
along with the transmissions of ps1 and ps2 . We can see that a high correlation can be caused
if pp1 = pa1 , or pp2 = pa1 , or pp1 = pa2 , or pp2 = pa2 . If any of the four conditions holds,
0 is decoded as 1 and a bit error occurs. In practice, a few bit errors can be tolerated by
ECC. For example, the standard (255, 223) Reed-Solomon code is capable of correcting up
to 16 bit errors among every 223 information bits of a message [90]. If the ECC can correct
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Figure 3.11: The probability that the attacker jams the communication when the length of
the message is 64 and 128 bits respectively.
a maximum of

bit errors of the original message but the jammer can flip more than

bits,

then jammer is successful and the receiver cannot reconstruct the original message.
In our simulation, we set the padded spread message lengths to be 64 and 128, and set
the error correction code capability ECCCap to be 1% - 3%, which means that the number
of tolerable bit errors is 1%

3% of the message length. Specifically, ECCCap = 1% for

length-128 message and ECCCap = 3% for length-64 message. We perform 500 trials. In
each trial, we spread the message by picking a random code sequence from C. We also
generate random codes for the jammer. To calculate the probability that the message to be
jammed, we count the number of error bits that a↵ected by the jammer. If this number is
larger than ECCCap ⇥ L0 , then the trial is considered as failed. The probability that the

message is jammed is finally calculated by number of failed trials . Figure 3.11 shows the
total number of trials
simulation results for RP-DSSS. The jamming probability decreases significantly as the code
set size increases. In particular, the jamming probability is around 0.01 for the code set size
of 60.
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Chapter 4: Random Allocation Seed-DSSS Broadcast Communication against
Jamming Attacks
1

In this chapter , we propose a new scheme that we refer to as RAS-DSSS against jamming
attacks. Similar to the traditional DSSS, RAS-DSSS spreads messages using spreading code
sequences, and to remove the requirement of a pre-define secret key, RAS-DSSS uses multiple
sets of code sequences to spread a random seed and the original message. In the following,
we first introduce DSD-DSSS and its vulnerabilities, and then we present the proposed RASDSSS scheme that enhances the security of DSD-DSSS.
4.1

Basic Scheme of Delayed Seed Disclosure-DSSS
DSD-DSSS achieves the anti-jamming capability by spreading an original message based

on a random seed. This random seed is used to generate random spreading codes to spread
the original message. To disclose a random seed, DSD-DSSS appends it to the end of the
spreading message. The receiver bu↵ers the received message, decodes the random seed to
regenerate the spreading codes, and then recover an original message using the spreading
codes.
4.1.1 The Limitations of DSD-DSSS
DSD-DSSS has some key limitations that can make it vulnerable to the jammer. In the
following, we discuss these limitations and security issues of DSD-DSSS:
3

This chapter was published in SecureComm 2019 [91]. Permission is included in Appendix A.

39

...

Spreading message (C/ , m)

Seed(C2 , s3 )

...

Jammer

Figure 4.1: The limitation of DSD-DSSS.
1. In DSD-DSSS, a sender first spreads the last bit of a seed using a random code sequence.
Then he spreads the rest of bits of a seed one by one from the end to the beginning
based on a specific function. At the end, the sender appends the spread seed to the
end of the spreading message. Note that the sender always appends the spreading seed
at the end of the spreading message. If the size of a message is fixed, the jammer can
focus on jamming the seed only to prevent the receiver from identifying the seed and
recover the original message. On the other hand, if the size of the message is dynamic,
the computation overhead for despreading will increase at the receiver, and a jammer
can still send random codes from to confuse the receiver.
2. In terms of the computation overhead, in DSD-DSSS, a receiver needs to de-spread
a random seed in order to regenerate the spreading codes used to spread an original
message. To achieve this, a receiver bu↵ers the received message. Then he needs to
locate a seed from the received message. This can take a non-trivial computational
time. Assume that a random seed is of ls -bit, the length of the spreading code is lc ,
and the receiver applies a sliding window approach to identify a seed. The size of the
sliding window should be ls ⇥ l.
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pseudo-random generator

random indexes:
si d1 || sid2 ||…|| si di

code sequences:
Ce [sidi]||Ce[sidi ]||…||Ce [sidi]

random indexes:
mid1 ||mid2 ||…||midi

code sequences:
Cp [midi ]||Cp [midi ]||…||Cp [midi ]

message mi

S

S

S(Cp , si)

S(Cp , m1−(pos−1) )

S(Ce , mpos− lm )

random
position
(pos)

Figure 4.2: The proposed system (RAS-DSSS).

4.2

RAS-DSSS
We create a new scheme to overcome the limitations of DSD-DSSS, In DSD-DSSS, a

sender always discloses a seed at the end of a spread message. Although, a sender spreads
a seed using random codes. A jammer may target the seed only to prevent the receiver
from recovering an original message. Instead of appending a seed to the end of a spread
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message, we propose to allocate a seed at a random position of a spread message to reduce
the probability that a jammer can identify the location of the seed. We also design a
new technique that assists a receiver to determine the position of a random seed with low
computation overhead.
4.2.1 Code Sets
Both a sender and a receiver share two publicly known spreading code sequences sets Cp
and Ce which are used to spread an original message M and a random seed si , respectively.
Cp and Ce do not overlap with each other, and the cross-correlation between spreading codes
are low, and each spreading code has its unique index code. We assume that each code in
Cp and Ce is of lc bits.
4.2.2 Spreading the Original Message
If the original message M is of lm -bit. The sender spreads each bit in M separately based
on the chosen spreading code from the spreading code set Cp . Figure 4.2 shows an example of
generating the spreading message. First, a sender needs to generate a random seed si , which
is used with a pseudo-random generator to generate lm random indexes mid1 , mid2 , ..., midlm ,
where 1 midi  |Cp |. Then a sender uses these indexes to spread each bit in M with its
corresponding spreading code in Cp . For example, the first bit in M is spread using Cp [mid1 ]
and so on for the rest of the bits in M . We denote S(Cp , M ) as the spreading message.
4.2.3 Spreading the Seed
To protect a seed from being jammed, a sender spreads a seed using the spreading codes
in Ce . Assume that a seed s is of ls -bit. The sender spreads each bit of s by drawing
codes from Ce based on the random choices of indexes sid1 ||sid2 ||...||sidls in Ce . The sender
transmits the same spreading message twice. In each transmission, a sender spreads a seed
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using di↵erent codes from Ce . Assume that s with length ls equal to 3 bits is spread in the
first transmission using c1 , c10 , and c8 . Also assume that S(Ce , s) represents the result of
the spreading outcome of a seed in the first transmission. In the second transmission, this
seed will be spread using codes di↵erent from those used in the first transmission (e.g. c3 ,
c7 , and c6 ). The result of this spreading is denoted as Sx (Ce , s). The reason for this is to
make sure there is no repetition between the chosen codes used to spread s, and sx . As a
result, this reduces the result of the computed correlation between S(Ce , s) and Sx (Ce , s) to
the lower level.
4.2.4 Randomization the Position of the Seed
As mentioned earlier, a sender uses the random seed to generate the indexes of the
spreading codes to spread an original message M . If a seed is disclosed at the end of the
spreading message, the attacker can easily target a seed to prevent a receiver from recovering
an original message. To address this concern, we propose to randomize the position of a seed
in the spreading message to confuse the attacker and reduce the probability that a seed is
jammed. In figure 4.2, we denote the random position of a seed as pos. Then a seed S(Ce , si )
is positioned between S(Cp , M1:pos 1 ), and S(Cp , Mpos:lm ).
4.2.5 Despreading Process
If a receiver can identify the position of a seed from the received spreading messages, he
can successfully recover an original message by regenerating the indexes used by a sender
to spread M . As we mentioned earlier, multiple spreading messages will be received by the
receiver. In each transmission, a random seed is inserted at a random position di↵erent
from the one in the previous transmission. Figure 4.3 gives an example for the de-spreading
process. After the first transmission, a random seed inserted at pos1 in the spread message.
However, in the second transmission, a random seed positioned at pos2 , and we assume that
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pos1 6= pos2 . A receiver bu↵ers both received messages and then scans both messages using
a sliding window approach.
Sliding
Window
SPM(

...

S(C$ , m( )(*+,- )() )

S(C* , s2 )

S(C$ , m *+,- ) / 0)

...

pos(

SPMF

...

S(C$ , m( )(*+,> )() )
Direction

S? (C* , s2 )

S(C$ , m *+,> ) / 0)

...

posF

Figure 4.3: Locating the position of the seed.

4.2.6 Sliding Window Approach
In Figure 4.3, to obtain the position of the seed, a receiver needs to compare between the
two received spreading messages SP M1 and SP M2 using a sliding window approach. Assume
that W denotes the window size of a sliding window, and W = ls ⇥ lc . Where ls and lc
represent the length of a random seed and the length of the spreading code, respectively. If x
= x1 , x2 , ..., xk , and y = y1 , y2 , ..., yk represent the first W in SP M1 and SP M2 , respectively.
P
A receiver computes the correlation between x and y which can be calculated by k1 ki=1 xi yi .

If the result of this computed correlation is above the threshold value , this means High
(H). If not, that means Low (L). In the second time, a receiver shifts the sliding window
to the right by one chip and this sliding window can be denoted as 2W . Following that a
receiver computes the correlation between x and y within 2W , and so on to the end of SP M1
and SP M2 . After performing lm + ls comparisons, the receiver can obtain the position of a
random seed within SP M1 .
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Table 4.1: Definition of symbol.
Symbol

Definition

M

The original message

si

The random seed

lm

The length of M

ls

The length of si

lc

The length of each spreading code

Ce

Spreading codes set to spread M

Cp

Spreading codes set to spread si

i

Number of spreading codes in Ce

S(Ce , M )

The result of spreading M

S(Cp , si )

The result of spreading si

P OS1

The chosen random position

Cx

A long spreading code

Tseed

The time required by the receiver to obtain si

Pnrj

The probability for a non-reactive to jam si

Prj

The probability for a reactive to jam si

Once the seed is localized, the receiver can start de-spreading the seed to regenerate the
indexes used for spreading the original message by trying all possible spreading codes in Ce .
The reason for this is because the seed is spread using random codes from Ce . As a result,
the receiver applies a sliding window approach with window size lc . If ci and ŝ represent
the chosen spreading code from Ce and the first lc chips from the seed, the receiver uses a
sliding window approach to compute the correlation between ci and ŝ. If the receiver gets
a maximum correlation, this means that ci was used to spread ŝ in the seed. The receiver
applies this using all spreading codes in Ce to retrieve the seed. Indeed, the receiver performs
the reverse processes done by a sender to recover an original message.
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4.2.7 Computation Overhead
A receiver needs to despread a random seed to regenerate the spreading codes used to
spread the original message. In DSD-DSSS, the receiver needs to synchronize and decode
the random seed to regenerate the spreading codes used to spread the original message.
This means that the computation overhead is high compared with RAS-DSSS. As a result,
a receiver may try all possible spreading codes in Ce to spread chips in the received message
and recover the random seed. Assume that Tseed is the time required by the receiver to
obtain the random seed within the received message.

Tseed = ((lm ⇥ lc ) + (ls ⇥ lc )) ⇥ i
In RAS-DSSS, a receiver uses a sliding window approach to identify the position of a seed.
He computes the correlation between the two spreading messages with window size ls X lc to
obtain the beginning of a seed. In RAS-DSSS, since the length of the spreading message is
fixed, the computation overhead mainly depends on obtaining the position of a random seed.
If a seed is positioned at the beginning of the spread message, the computation overhead will
be O(1), which is the best case. In the worst case, the computation overhead will be O(n),
because a receiver performs the comparison for n time until he finds the low correlation that
indicates the position of a seed. Thus the time required by the receiver to obtain the random
seed in the received message is:

Tseed = ((P OS1

1) ⇥ lc ) + (ls ⇥ lc ⇥ i)

In general, RAS-DSSS is more secure compared with DSD-DSSS, and it reduces the computation time to a lower level. This is because the seed is always inserted within the spreading
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message. If the seed is inserted in P OS1 , then (P OS1
tation time to obtain the position of the seed by (lm
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. ..

begining of the random seed

Figure 4.4: Security enhancement.

4.2.8 Security Enhancement
As discussed earlier, because RAS-DSSS randomizes the position of a random seed, the
jammer needs to first obtain the location of the seed before he can launch targeted jamming
against the seed. However, the attacker may spread random bits and transmit them to the
receiver to confuse the despreading. Consequently, a receiver may not recover a random
seed correctly. To mitigate such threat, we propose to spread the beginning of a random
seed using long spreading codes. The sender can choose the length of the spreading codes
based on the observations on the received messages. For example, if the receiver identifies
multiples received spreading messages have been jammed, the sender spreads the first 4-bit
of the random seed using long spreading codes. This will increase the chance to identify
the position of the random seed within the spreading message. If Clong represents the set of
the long spreading codes compared with those Ce . For example, the length of the spreading
codes Clong is 2048-chip compared with 1024-chip in Ce . Figure 4.4 gives an example of
spreading a random seed using long spreading codes. If Cx1 , Cx2 , Cx3 , and Cx4 represent
these long spreading codes form Clong to spread the first 4-bit of the random seed. This will
mitigate the e↵ects of a jammer who sends continuously random spreading codes from Ce .
Also this provides an efficient way against DoS attacks.
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4.2.9 Advantages for a Receiver over a Jammer
In RAS-DSSS, a receiver has some advantages over a jammer to mitigate the e↵ects of
the jammer. These advantages are summarized below:
1. The receiver can fully bu↵er the received messages and take his time to localize and
desoread a random seed. While a jammer has to perform real time analysis to know
the position of the seed and the spreading codes used to spread a seed for jamming
the seed. Moreover, the jammer has to search over all spreading codes to jam the seed
within the transmission time of one message. Assume that the length of an original
message is of 1024 bits, the length of a random seed is of 16 bits, and the spreading
code is of 128 bits. The transmission time of the spreading message at a 11-M bps
data rate is =

(1024+16)⇥128
11⇥106

= 0.0121 ms. This means that a jammer must identify

the spreading codes within 0.0121 ms, whereas the receiver does not have the time
limitation.
2. A reactive jammer does not have enough information regarding the position of a random seed. As a result, a jammer can not target the part of the spreading message that
contains a seed. Instead, he may guess the position of a seed only. The probability
that a reactive jammer can successfully guess the position of a random seed is low.
Assume lm = 1024

bit, and a random seed is going to be inserted within M. Then

the probability that a reactive jammer can guess the correct position of a random seed
1
is ( 1024
). On the contrary, as we explain in the previous point, the receiver can bu↵er

both messages and take his time to obtain and despread a random seed.
3. A reactive jammer can not e↵ectively jam a bit of a seed or the message unless he has
the prior knowledge about the spreading code used for this bit. For example, if the
i-th bit of the random seed is spread using spreading code c10 , then a jammer can not
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e↵ectively jam this bit unless he knows which spreading code is used to spread this
bit. It is infeasible for a reactive jammer to guess or know which spreading code used
to spread a particular bit of a random seed or message within a transmission time.
Again, the receiver does not su↵er from this time constraint issue.
4.2.10 How to Confuse a Reactive Jammer?
As we explained earlier, a jammer always targets the most important part of the spreading
message which is a seed. If a jammer can successfully jam a seed, a receiver can not recover
an original message. RSA-DSSS confuses the jammer from identifying the position of the
seed to reduce the probability that a seed is jammed in the following ways:
1. We use a large size of Cp and Ce to discourage a reactive jammer. Specifically, in RASDSSS, both a sender and receiver use publicly known Cp and Ce sets to spread both
an original message and a seed. By adopting large sets, a jammer needs to perform a
huge amount of computations. This means the number of the correlations required by
a jammer is (lm ⇥ Cp ) + (ls ⇥ Ce ). For example, if the size of Cp and Ce is 1000, lm is
128 bits, and ls is 16-bit bits. The number of correlation needs to be calculated by the
attacker within the transmission time of one messgae is = (128 ⇥ 1000) + (16 ⇥ 1000)
= 144,000.
2. In RAS-DSSS, a sender inserts a seed in a random position. This position is only
known to a sender. For example, in the first transmission of the spreading message, we
denote (P OS1 ) as a random position chosen by a sender to hide a seed from a jammer.
In the second transmission of the same spreading message, a sender spreads a seed
using di↵erent spreading codes that do not overlap with those chosen for spreading the
first transmission. This will result in a low correlation between the spreading seed in
both transmissions.
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Figure 4.5: The correlation between SP M1 and SP M2 , and CDF of the high and low
correlation of the received spreading messages in the presence of three types of attackers 1,
2 and 3.
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4.3

Simulation Results

4.3.1 Analysis
RAS-DSSS provides a countermeasure against a jammer who targets either the body of
the spreading message or a random seed to prevent a receiver from recovering an original
message M . We assume the following types of attacks:
• In attack type 1, a jammer injects random noise or random bits to disrupt the wireless
communication between the sender and the receiver. If the jammer can successfully jam
the seed, then the receiver cannot recover a random seed and regenerate the sequence
of spreading codes used to spread the original message M .
• In attack type 2, the jammer keeps sending random spreading codes from Ce to the
receiver. As a result, the receiver needs to de-spread a seed using all codes in Ce . This
means that the receiver has to try all possible combinations to recover the original
message. This attack is thus a Denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
• In attack type 3, the jammer knows the spreading codes used by the sender to spread
an original message. In this type of the attack, the jammer spreads random bits using
the same spreading codes used by the sender, and sends them to the receiver.
We consider the following jamming strategies:
1. Non-reactive jamming:
Non-reactive jammers have no knowledge about the legitimate channel status. They
need to guess what spreading codes are used by the sender to jam the wireless channel.
Jamming interval I (where I > 0) represents the period of the time between the pulses
of jamming produced by a jammer, and it also defines the behavior of a jammer. If
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the attacker decides to jam the wireless channel for a long time, I should be a small
value [92].

Figure 4.6: Di↵erent situations show the e↵ects when the seed (sx ) in the second spreading
(SP M2 ) message is not shifted, or shifted by 8, 16, 24 bits on the decision to identify the
position of the seed in the first spreading message (SP M1 ).

52

2. Reactive jamming:
Sensing channel is essential for a reactive jammer. If the channel is idle, a jammer
will be quiet. If a jammer detects wireless communication between the sender and the
receiver, he starts emitting a noise signal. We point out that the reactive jammer has
a time constraint compared with the receiver. As mentioned earlier, the jammer must
de-spread a message within the transmission time of the message, whereas a receiver
can record the message and take his time to de-spread it. Due to the time constraint,
it is difficult for a reactive jammer to launch the real-time analysis to compute which
code sequences are used by a sender to spread a random seed, because the jammer
needs to obtain the correct spreading codes by searching on all possible code sequences
within a very short time.
4.3.2 Evaluation
We validate the performance of RSA-DSSS using simulations on Matlab. In our simulation, we adopt the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) simulation channel. A sender
sends the spreading messages through a AWGN channel, the simulation of which is performed
by adding white gaussian noise to the transmitted signal. A jammer emits interference signals to prevent the receiver from recovering an original message. In our experiment, we use
Hadamard function to generate spreading codes for Cp and Ce to spread the first message
M and a random seed si , respectively. We set the length of an original message M to be
128 bits, the length of a random seed si to be 16 bits, and the length of each spreading code
to be 512 bits. Also, in our simulation, we assumed that the transmission is in the presence
of the three aforementioned attackers, namely, types 1, 2, and 3 attackers.
As mentioned previously, a sender positions a seed at a random location within a spreading message, and uses two transmissions to send the spreading messages to a receiver. A
receiver takes advantages of bu↵ering the received messages to obtain and recover a seed.
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As a result, in our simulation, we built a comparison function that computes, using a sliding
window approach, the correlation between the received messages. The result of this comparison reveals the position of the seed. For example, if the outcome of this comparison is
higher than a threshold, we consider that no seed is identified within the window size.
Figure 4.5 represents the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the result of the
correlation between two received spreading messages SP M1 and SP M2 in the presence of
jammers type 1, 2 and 3. CDF gives us the cumulative of the probability associated with the
computed correlation between SP M1 and SP M2 , and also helps us to decide the appropriate
threshold that indicates the correct position of a random seed within SP M1 . From figures
4.5 (a), (b), and (c), the dashed line represents the low correlation between SP M1 and
SP M2 , where a random seed is localized by the receiver, and the solid line represents the
high correlation. From figure 4.5 (a), for example, 94% low correlations are smaller than
or equal to 0.55, but only 0.1% high correlations are smaller than or equal to 0.55. This
means that if we use 0.55 as the threshold, we will obtain the detection rate of a seed at the
probability of 0.94 and this threshold also gives a false alarm rate of 0.1%.
Figure 4.6 shows four situations, when we calculate the correlation between the two
spreading messages to identify the location of the seed. In each situation, we shift the
position of the seed by multiplying the number of shifted bits by lc . In the first situation,
the random seed is at the same position for both messages, and we can see that the low
correlation results in a small segment only ⇡ 0.56. As we explained previously, the sender
spreads a random seed in the second spreading message using di↵erent spreading codes from
the one used in the first transmission, and the result of the spreading is Sx (Ce , s). Thus,
low correlation results from the situation where both S(Ce , s) and Sx (Ce , s) are in the same
position in the spreading message. As we can see, the blue line represents the computed
correlation between SP M1 and SP M2 when the seed is inserted within SP M1 and SP M2 at
the same position (within bit 41). When there is no shifting, the computed high correlation
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remains stable at 0.62 before reaching bit number 41 where the seed is inserted. After that,
there is a noticeable drop in the blue line from 0.62 to 0.48 ⇠ 0.52 which is resulted from
the reduction of the computed correlation. This almost remains until bit number 57 where
the seed end.From this, we can observe that when the random seed is inserted in the same
position within SP M1 and SP M2 , the low correlation points exactly to the position of the
random seed. Also, the low correlation boundary is the length of the random seed.
On the other hand, when the seed is inserted at di↵erent positions (i.e., P OS1 and P OS2 ),
the result of the low correlation varies based on the position shift. This results in increasing
the window size where the result of the correlation is low. This indicates that the position
of the seed is shifted in the second spreading message. As a result, the cost of the search on

Num of success trials to find POS1

the receiver will increase as by the amount of the shift.
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Figure 4.7: Number of success trials to find the position of the seed.

We run the simulation program for 1000 times with di↵erent lengths of the spreading
codes to discover the impact of attacker types 1, 2, and 3 on a receiver to identify the
position of a seed. Figure 4.7 shows the number of successful trials to find the location
of a random seed. For instance, when the length of a spreading code is 256, the receiver
can successfully identify a random seed with detection rates 0.643, 0.672, and 0.031 in the
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presence of attack type 1, attack type 2, and attack type 3, respectively. On the other hand,
when the length of the spreading code is 1024, the receiver can successfully identify the
position of a random seed with detection rates 0.860, 0.891, and 0.11 in the presence of these
attackers. We observe that increasing the length of the spreading codes can significantly
improve the detection rate.
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Figure 4.8: Probability for a non-reactive jammer to jam the seed.
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Figure 4.9: Probability for a reactive jammer to jam the seed.
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Also, similar to ( [23], Theorem 2 and 3), we compute the probabilities for both a nonreactive and reactive jammers to jam a random seed during the transmission time when Ce
and Cp have di↵erent sizes of spreading codes using equations 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
1
) lm )
lc ⇥ (Cp + Ce )

Pnrj = 1

(1

(

Prj = 1

(1

1 lm
) ⇥ (1
Cp

1 ls
)
Ce

(4.1)

(4.2)

Intuitively, increasing the size of Ce and Cp can reduce the probability that the seed is
jammed. Figure 4.8 shows the probability for a non-reactive jammer to jam a random seed.
As we can see from this figure, p=0.015 when the size of Ce and Cp is 1000, and p significantly
reduces to 0.001 when the size Ce and Cp is increased to 7000. On the other hand, figure
4.9 represents the probability for a reactive jammer to jam a random seed. As we can see
from the figure, p=0.019 when the size of Ce and Cp is 7000. The size of Ce and Cp play an
important role in reducing the probability that the jammer can jam the seed. The reason
for this is that it is hard for the jammer to exhaustively search over all possible spreading
codes in Ce and Cp when their sizes are big. Furthermore, it is impossible for the jammer to
do real-time analysis within a transmission time.
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Chapter 5: Future Work

I discuss three directions for my future work. First, I introduce new techniques that would
increase the robustness and e↵ectiveness of my current works in chapters 3 and 4. In the
second direction for my future studies, I argue how we can use a friendly jammer to mitigate
the e↵ects of a relay attack. Lastly, I describe my plan on investigating vulnerabilities
associated with the internet of things.
5.1

Future Possible Approaches to My Current Works
There are a couple of approaches that I plan to develop and enhance the performance

and security concerns in both systems in Chapter 3 and 4.
5.1.1 Fragmentation the Seed into Equal Chunks within a Spread Message
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Figure 5.1: Enhanced RAS-DSSS.
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In chapter 3, to improve the security of RAS-DSSS, I plan to break the seed into equal
chunks, i.e., two fragments that can be inserted randomly within the spread message by
applying the same steps of RAS-DSSS. In each transmission, the two chunks of the seed will
be positioned in a random di↵erent position. To recover the seed, we apply two steps of a
sliding window approach, as we can see in 5.2. The first step is to obtain the position of
the first part of the seed withing spreading message one. In the second step, the receiver
obtains the position of the first part of the seed within the second spreading message. To
obtain the second part of the seed, we repeat these steps. This will reduce the probability
the attacker can jam the seed. However, it will increase the computation overhead since the
receiver needs to identify the correct positions of these two fragments of the seed.
5.1.2 Adoption the Length of the Spreading Code
Form the evaluations result in Chapters 3 and 4, in RP-DSSS and RAS-DSSS, as the
length of the spreading code increases the probability that the spreading message is jammed
decreases. From this point, I plan to adapt the length of the spreading code, which uses to
spread the original message, based on the capability of the jammer, which can be observed
based on the received message. This can play an important role in reducing the probability
that the received message is jammed, and reducing the computation overhead at the receiver
side.
5.2

Friendly Jamming
Another direction for my future work is using a friendly jammer to protect the confi-

dentiality of data during the communication, and message authentication purposes. In the
presence of friendly jamming, ”jamming is used for the good and strives to be minimally invasive,” [93]. Recent works have been conducted in this area (e.g., [2,61,94–101]). Particularly,
some of these researches use jamming to block harmful communication (e.g., [2, 102–106]),
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and others use jamming to improve the security of communications (e.g., [107–112]). Intentional interference considers as a valuable resource to secure wireless communications.
For instance, increasing the level of the noise at the attacker side (e.g., the eavesdropper)
prevents him/her from recovering the network messages attacking the communication.
Parking
lot

Home or
air port

AP.

AP/

Friendly
Jammer

Figure 5.2: A friendly jamming against relay attacks.

In my future studies, I plan to implement a system against a relay attack using a friendly
jammer. For example, In [113], when the car owner steps away from his/her car, the attacker
could relay the vehicles key fob to open and run a vehicle. To mitigate the e↵ects of this
kind of attack, I plan to use friendly jamming signals to be a wall between the user and the
attacker. For example, when the driver locked his/her care, and walk away from the car, a
simple jamming single can be used to prevent the attacker from relaying the vehicles key fob
to the car end. A friendly jamming signal will closer to the owner than the car.
5.3

Security Issues in Internet of Things
Nowadays, there has been a dramatic increase in using IoT. However, it must be recog-

nized that the security threats and issues have been rapidly involved in IoT. As a result, it
is crucial to pay more attention and put appropriate considerations on these IoT security
vulnerabilities and challenges. For example, Denial of service attacks can a↵ect all legitimate
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users and nodes from accessing all available resources of the network. Also, this type of attacker may destroy configuration information. For this, to protect the IoT form this type of
attacker, I will focus and put much e↵ort into developing techniques to monitor the system
and detect any indications that the system is a↵ected by DoS attacks. Recent studies have
focused on this attack (e.g., [61, 72, 114–116]).
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

This dissertation presents two works against jamming attacks on wireless communication
systems.
In the first work, we propose the RP-DSSS scheme to enhance the security of RD-DSSS.
Instead of placing an index code at a fixed location, we hide the index code by inserting it at a
random position of a spread message. To enable the receiver to find the position of the index
code, we design an “onion” spreading mechanism, which recursively encodes the random
positions using RP-DSSS, and pads additional spreading codes to reduce the probability
that a jammer can infer these random positions. To achieve the anti-jamming without
shared key, the spreading and despreading operations of RP-DSSS totally utilize publicly
known sets of spreading codes and code sequences. We also propose new schemes to enhance
the security of RP-DSSS scheme by padding and randomizing the message transmission
orders. We performed both theoretical analysis and computer simulations to validate the
performance of the proposed approaches.
In the second work, we propose RAS-DSSS system to increase the security of DSD-DSSS.
RAS-DSSS positions a seed at a random location of a spreading message to reduce the chance
that a seed to be jammed. We also design a new mechanism that enables a receiver to locate
the position of a seed using a sliding window. This can reduce the computational overhead
of the proposed system compared with a DSD-DSSS system. We performed computer simulations to validate the e↵ectiveness of RAS-DSSS, and the results show that RAS-DSSS can
successfully obtain the position of a seed. Our experiment results show that our proposed
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system can successfully obtain the position of the random seed, and the detection rates can
be increased successfully when we increase the length of the spreading codes.
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Appendix A: Tables

Table A1: Detection rates in the presence of attackers type 1,2, and 3 when the length of
spreading code (Ic ) is 256, 512,and 1024, respectively
Ic
256
512
1024

type 1
27.54
29.55
25.99

Attackers
type 2
type 3
13.23
6.80
9.61
6
11.49
6.15
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